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Conclusion
A Continued Evolution
National security holds a relevance and importance 
that goes beyond mere internal stability. Its signi! cance 
includes the well-being and prosperity of citizens and 
the populations they form, as well as the relations 
between all countries on a regional and global basis. At 
the fulcrum of domestic politics and governance and as 
the mainstay of international a" airs, upholding national 
security is the raison d’être of any country’s existence. 
Although ‘national’ in designation, at its heart and due 
to its interactional, relative, and inter-connected nature, 
security is inalienably inter-national.
 Due to its complexity, which is ever-growing in 
intricacy and density as more interests, threats, and 
fears enter its contemporary orbits, national security—
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for India and for other actors—must be regarded as 
being continually evolving. New Delhi’s own experi-
ences since Independence point to such an attribute, 
as India’s expanding global interaction and status have 
led to her increased level of global participation and 
a corresponding widening of national security issues. 
A more visible, resource-hungry, and trade-dependent 
India has necessitated this involvement, along with the 
greater and growing diversity of threats that she faces, 
internally as well as externally. This change has come 
both from within India itself and also from a shifting 
international system.
 Here, we evaluate and re! ect on the constructivist 
approach laid out in this book concerning our focus 
on core principles relating to history, identity, culture, 
values, and interaction, before appraising the appro-
priateness and applicability of Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs. We then consider how successful New Delhi’s 
current performance is in e" ectively responding 
to, curtailing, and even nullifying the host of threats 
challenging India. All of this leads us to consider the 
central quandary facing the study of national secu-
rity—in India and elsewhere—of paradox and parallax, 
and how complete freedom from threat for coun-
tries is essentially unobtainable, and that as a # eld of 
study it is in reality far more concerned with national 
insecurity.
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We have described the major facets, actors, and tools 
that are inherent to national security, and how their 
analysis can help indicate what is speci! c to the Indian 
context. Deploying a constructivist approach premised 
upon the inclusion of identity-focused factors that go 
beyond more military (realist) and solely material-based 
accounts, our analysis unveiled the nature, delivery, and 
extent of Indian national security. To aid this analytical 
foundation, we also used Maslow’s hierarchy of needs 
to show the range of requirements that national 
security must meet.
Analytical Attributes
• History: Highlighted the origins and roots of New 
Delhi’s national security concerns from badly 
demarcated borders—legacy of the colonial occupa-
tion (and the consequent territorial con" icts across 
India’s borders)—to engrained con" ict and tension 
with Pakistan (through repeated con" ict). India’s 
wariness of the international system as a whole, as 
well as the desire of her leaders to enhance their 
country’s position in it (and inherently to ensure 
its continued survival), also stems from such anti-
imperial and anti-colonial urges.
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• Identity: Revealed that there are speci! c and particu-
lar elements that characterize a uniquely Indian per-
spective concerning what is important vis-à-vis her 
national security behaviour. The distinctive nature 
of India’s political system (and focus on democracy 
and secularism) as well as her physical outline (as per 
her desired borders in South Asia) and her guiding 
self-image (to become a modern great power in the 
twenty-! rst century) all derive from this basis. Just 
as India has its own viewpoint on national security, 
so too will others.
• Culture: Con! rmed that context-speci! c histories, 
experiences, memories, and identities produce 
country-speci! c cultures. From this basis, India’s 
past (and how it is recalled by her leaders and then 
juxtaposed with future national ambitions) denotes 
a precise form of exclusivity that advises how her 
policy is made and the preferences upon which it 
is based. The repetition of key ideas, fears, interests, 
con" icts, and agreements serve to formulate this 
culture, making it distinguishable from more short-
lived sets of values and principles.
• Perception: Underscored that the various perspec-
tives of its leaders, elites, and institutions in" uence 
the delineation of national security. By informing 
the formation of national identity and national 
culture, such perceptions aid our understanding of 
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security and, by extension, which threats are then 
challenging these interests. Importantly, perceptions 
can change—especially concerning the meaning 
of history and its recollection or memory, which 
underlines their importance.
• Interaction: Acknowledged that national security 
tasks are not performed in isolation, and that a 
country’s interests, desires, issues, and fears are all 
dependent upon exchanges with others—either in 
the past, the present, or the future. Equally, while we 
can analyse Indian national security, other countries 
have their own corresponding sets of national 
security interests, desires, issues, and fears speci! c 
to their history, identity, culture, and perception. 
Interaction, coalescence, and divergence across these 
zones regulate inter-national security.
Maslow’s Hierarchy
As per Figure C.1 , Maslow’s hierarchy of needs 
determined the di" erent levels of needs that national 
security must meet, as per the granting of sovereignty 
by a population to her leaders. The host of security 
concerns raised in this book mapped onto each of the 
diagram’s levels, with basic biological needs pertaining 
to the supply of water, food, warmth, and shelter being 
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followed by larger (societal) safety needs concerning 
employment, access to resources, family, health, and 
property. All of these elements directly correlated with 
internal national security interests and aims.
 Further up the scale, the esteem needs—of 
independence, status, dominance, prestige and respect 
from others—speci! cally related to sovereignty and 
territorial issues, along with India’s long-sought quest 
FIGURE C.1: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs
Source: Taken from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Maslow%27s_Hierarchy_of_Needs.svg for use under 
Creative Commons Attribution.
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At the zenith of the hierarchy are self-actualization 
needs regarding realizing potential and self-ful! lment. 
Of note is that our analysis did not include the middle 
level of love or belonging but which could be applied 
to seeing the world in a positive or negative light, as 
based upon assurance or as based upon fear. If the 
latter perspective is prevalent, it suggests that national 
security may not ever be wholly obtainable.
 We must also note that in Maslow’s original designa-
tion of his hierarchy, there was an emphasis on progres-
sion. As such, when applied to the individual, the basic 
physiological needs at the bottom of the pyramid were 
to be attained ! rst before other higher needs could 
be realized. In contrast, in our analysis we related how 
these needs collectively form a set of requirements 
that an aspiring great power such as India is seeking 
to meet simultaneously. As such, elites are pursuing 
esteem and self-actualization needs at the same time as 
physiological and safety needs. Tellingly in this regard, 
and given the government’s current shortcomings 
concerning these latter elements, it may be in India’s 
national interest to ful! l Maslow’s original intentions 
of ! rst fully meeting basic needs, as only then will New 
Delhi be able to genuinely achieve its great power 
aspirations.
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How Is India Doing?
As with all elements of national security, evaluating 
how well a country is doing in terms of meeting its 
core interests (and combating accompanying fears) is 
a relative process. On the most basic count, governing 
elites in India are far from meeting biological needs, 
with large portions of the population currently 
without sustained access to electricity, running water, 
and sanitation. That stated, New Delhi does guarantee 
some level of food security as well as rudimentary 
access to work so as to better achieve these safety needs 
along with family, health, and property needs. Large 
national and local security forces are present to counter 
myriad founts of instability and, along with her armed 
forces, seek to provide a safer and securer environment 
for India’s citizens.
 At the root of these issues is the size of India’s 
population, which has always magni! ed such resource-
based needs on a scale that only leaders in Beijing 
are familiar with. Decades of rapid economic growth 
are producing results though, and India is, without 
doubt, trying to develop and modernize many facets 
of its infrastructure. An outward-looking and outward-
embracing economic policy is bolstering these aims and, 
if growth can be maintained, one will see the gradual 
amelioration in each of these areas. The modernization 
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wider esteem and self-actualization needs, as more 
countries are recognizing India’s dominant position in 
South Asia and her emergent/emerged position as a 
great power. As with the other levels, these needs are 
not yet fully resolved, especially regarding her potential.
 Scale again plays a vital role by intensifying the 
threat posed by anything from insurgency to pollution, 
and is thus amplifying threats and incumbent fears to a 
level that would challenge any country. Among other 
issues, that over a tenth of her territory is contested, 
that an average of 2,000 people have died each year 
from terrorist and insurgent deaths since 1994, and that 
at least a million people are dying per year due to pol-
lution, indicate the extreme size of her problems.
 Such observations point to a few areas of conten-
tion. Firstly, India is a country transitioning to become 
a developed and modern entity, and as such we ought 
to temper our criticism of her current record and 
standing. Secondly though, and conversely, we must ask 
if the huge range of national security tools that India 
possesses—institutionally, legally, militarily, economi-
cally, and diplomatically—are su"  cient to meet the 
overload of national security threats that she faces. 
 Certainly, India has been censured on a number of 
occasions for not having the resources to adequately 
meet her national security needs. These include an 
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under-prepared and slow response to the mass 2008 
Mumbai attacks (despite receiving prior warning); 
having too insu!  cient a number of trained diplomats 
in the MEA; as well as modernizing her military forces 
without the necessary strategic overview, whereby 
even though it is spending vast sums on modernizing 
its forces and buying new weapons systems, there has 
been limited progress in general capabilities. Criticism 
of the conduct of her armed forces, widespread human 
rights abuses, and societal inequalities only add to 
the weight of denunciation that is periodically " xed 
towards India’s elites.
 At its most extreme—and when conveyed through 
the prism of thinking about national security interests 
with regard to the fears that challenge them—inad-
equate delivery in these areas can be seen to rest with 
those who are governing (and have governed) India. 
Certainly such an argument is pertinent domestically, 
concerning providing basic needs to India’s popula-
tion. By extension, incompetent leaders can thus be 
perceived as a national security threat in that they are/
were unable to protect national interests by e# ectively 
resolving the threats posed to them. Open political 
abuses such as corruption, nepotism, and patronage 
are the most egregious cases of such conduct. It is the 
virtue of (Indian) democracy that it is a mechanism for 
the population to remove such leaders.
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Paradox: A statement containing two opposite ideas 
that make it seem impossible or unlikely, although it 
is probably true.
Parallax: The e! ect whereby the position or direction 
of an object appears to di! er when viewed from 
di! erent positions.
While we can be both understanding and critical of 
New Delhi’s predicaments concerning the array of 
threats that she faces vis-à-vis her national security 
outlook, this treatise on Indian national security has 
also indicated an inherent quandary within such 
dynamics. This dilemma rests within the interactional 
aspect of our analytical stance, whereby security is a 
relational and relative exchange that occurs between 
actors. This dilemma rests within the interaction aspect 
of our analytical stance, whereby security is a relational 
and relative exchange that occurs between actors. So 
essential is this behaviour that if there were no such 
interaction there would be nothing for countries to be 
threatened by and thus nothing to fear. This conten-
tion brings us to two indispensable features of national 
security: paradox and parallax.
 Firstly, national security is a relational act that fre-
quently, and necessarily, brings countries (and other 
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actors) into con! ict with each other. As such, what 
may be a national security prerequisite for generations 
of Indian leaders, say concerning the status of Jammu 
and Kashmir as being wholly part of the Indian land-
mass, is diametrically opposed to it also concurrently 
being a precondition within, for instance, Pakistani 
national security. Applicable to almost any dispute or 
contestation, this innate tension produces the feature 
of paradox within national security analysis whereby 
there are competing but intractable claims for the same 
(material- or identity-based) end.
 Secondly, this observation also highlights that 
national security—in terms of negatively pertaining 
to mutually incompatible interests and ambitions—is 
inherently concerned with di" erence. In this way it 
is very di#  cult for actors (of any kind, at the inter-
national, national, or sub-national level) to perceive 
the same issue, problem, fear, assurance, and desire in 
exactly the same way, especially if it relates to a speci$ c 
paradoxical interaction between them. It is from this 
basis that our analysis of national security indicates a 
second feature—that of parallax—through which basic 
di" erences between those interacting fundamentally 
produces existential fear, threat, and danger.
 When applied to the vicissitudes of contemporary 
domestic and international politics, and its constant 
evolution and adaptation as actors continually interact 
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importantly show us that national security is never 
entirely in the singular control of its major actors. 
Thus, for India, if other neighbouring countries wish 
to contest their mutual borders, such issues will endure 
as a source of insecurity. Equally, if an insurgent group 
is unwilling to give up its alternative political or ter-
ritorial image of India, they will also persist as a threat 
to New Delhi. In these ways, it is the aim of national 
and international diplomacy to produce outcomes that 
di! erent parties are able to agree on and which meet 
their respective self-images.
 Such a task is far from straightforward, especially as 
it is the interaction between actors itself that frequently 
leads to an emboldening—and potentially worsen-
ing—of relations, and which is majorly reliant upon 
the perceptions governing them. For instance, New 
Delhi may feel that it is necessary to modernize her 
military forces so as to protect India’s trade and energy 
routes, and augment her international image as a devel-
oped great power. Such virtues are benign in isolation 
but may be seen as threatening by others (say Beijing), 
who then feel that they must also modernize their 
armed forces. Such interaction, even though rational 
and ostensibly peaceful in origin, is then the basis for 
an arms race and an insecurity spiral among two self-
interested actors.
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National (In)Security
Given these tensions, national security in its pur-
est sense is a highly idealized sentiment. As domestic 
politics and international a! airs rest upon interaction 
between actors in situations that are often paradoxical 
and zero-sum, the simultaneous attainment of complete 
security by all actors is impossible. At best, countries 
must balance achieving their national interests with 
some form of concession, which creates a more stable 
environment rather than exacerbating tensions. India’s 
multi-pronged international diplomacy, especially her 
membership of di! erent multilateral institutions that 
demand some loss of sovereignty, highlights the useful-
ness of such an attitude.
 In this way, there is a limit to what New Delhi can 
achieve, both literally in terms of the threats she faces 
and fundamentally in terms of the general paradigm 
of national security. What is also clear is that the focus 
of national security—for policymakers and analysts 
alike—principally lies on its negative aspects. As such, 
as much as we can examine national security inter-
ests—those things that a country or actor would pref-
erably like to accomplish—our discussion weighs more 
heavily on the threats towards these interests and the 
often deep-seated fears that they symbolize.
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such is the scale of these adverse features—especially 
when magni! ed by memory and imagination (of 
what might happen)—that there exists an in! nity of 
fear between actors that no number of tools can fully 
compensate for. Within such an atmosphere, and given 
that it a" ects all actors at some direct or indirect level, 
rather than thinking of national security, we are in 
actual fact considering national insecurity. Therefore, 
and even if New Delhi can resolve most of the threats 
she currently faces, because of its essentially utopian 
nature, any study of her national security really remains 
that of Indian national insecurity.
